02/01/2008 01:00 PM House JUDICIARY
| Audio | Topic |
|---|---|
| Start | |
| HB286 | |
| HB281 | |
| Adjourn |
+ teleconferenced
= bill was previously heard/scheduled
| += | HB 237 | TELECONFERENCED | |
| *+ | HB 286 | TELECONFERENCED | |
| *+ | HB 281 | TELECONFERENCED | |
ALASKA STATE LEGISLATURE
HOUSE JUDICIARY STANDING COMMITTEE
February 1, 2008
1:09 p.m.
MEMBERS PRESENT
Representative Jay Ramras, Chair
Representative Nancy Dahlstrom, Vice Chair
Representative John Coghill
Representative Ralph Samuels
Representative Lindsey Holmes
MEMBERS ABSENT
Representative Bob Lynn
Representative Max Gruenberg
COMMITTEE CALENDAR
HOUSE BILL NO. 286
"An Act relating to impersonating a public servant."
- MOVED HB 286 OUT OF COMMITTEE
HOUSE BILL NO. 281
"An Act extending the statute of limitations for the filing of
complaints with the Alaska Public Offices Commission involving
state election campaigns."
- HEARD AND HELD
HOUSE BILL NO. 237
"An Act authorizing the governor to remove or suspend a member
of the Board of Regents of the University of Alaska for good
cause; establishing a procedure for the removal or suspension of
a regent; and providing for an effective date."
- BILL HEARING CANCELED
PREVIOUS COMMITTEE ACTION
BILL: HB 286
SHORT TITLE: IMPERSONATING A PUBLIC SERVANT
SPONSOR(S): REPRESENTATIVE(S) DAHLSTROM
01/04/08 (H) PREFILE RELEASED 1/4/08
01/15/08 (H) READ THE FIRST TIME - REFERRALS
01/15/08 (H) JUD
02/01/08 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120
BILL: HB 281
SHORT TITLE: CAMPAIGN FINANCE COMPLAINTS
SPONSOR(S): REPRESENTATIVE(S) LYNN, GATTO
01/04/08 (H) PREFILE RELEASED 1/4/08
01/15/08 (H) READ THE FIRST TIME - REFERRALS
01/15/08 (H) STA, JUD
01/17/08 (H) STA AT 8:00 AM CAPITOL 106
01/17/08 (H) Heard & Held
01/17/08 (H) MINUTE(STA)
01/19/08 (H) STA AT 11:00 AM CAPITOL 106
01/19/08 (H) Moved CSHB 281(STA) Out of Committee
01/19/08 (H) MINUTE(STA)
01/22/08 (H) STA RPT CS(STA) NT 1DP 3NR 2AM
01/22/08 (H) DP: LYNN
01/22/08 (H) NR: ROSES, COGHILL, DOLL
01/22/08 (H) AM: JOHNSON, JOHANSEN
01/22/08 (H) FIN REFERRAL ADDED AFTER JUD
01/25/08 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120
01/25/08 (H) -- MEETING CANCELED --
02/01/08 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120
WITNESS REGISTER
JENNIFER BAXTER, Staff
to Representative Nancy Dahlstrom
Alaska State Legislature
Juneau, Alaska
POSITION STATEMENT: Presented HB 286 on behalf of the sponsor,
Representative Dahlstrom.
GARY "ROB" COX, President
Public Safety Employees Association, Inc. (PSEA);
State Trooper
B Detachment
Division of Alaska State Troopers
Department of Public Safety (DPS)
Palmer, Alaska
POSITION STATEMENT: Speaking on behalf of both the PSEA and the
DPS, provided comments and responded to questions during
discussion of HB 286, and urged its passage.
RICK SVOBODNY, Deputy Attorney General
Central Office
Criminal Division
Department of Law (DOL)
Juneau, Alaska
POSITION STATEMENT: Responded to questions during discussion of
HB 286.
JEFFREY LANDVATTER
Public Safety Employees Association, Inc. (PSEA);
State Trooper
A Detachment
Division of Alaska State Troopers
Department of Public Safety (DPS)
Juneau, Alaska
POSITION STATEMENT: Provided comments during discussion of
HB 286.
MIKE SICA, Staff
to Representative Bob Lynn
Alaska State Legislature
Juneau, Alaska
POSITION STATEMENT: Presented HB 281 on behalf of
Representative Lynn, one of the bill's joint prime sponsors.
REPRESENTATIVE CARL GATTO
Alaska State Legislature
Juneau, Alaska
POSITION STATEMENT: Spoke as a joint prime sponsor of HB 281.
BROOKE MILES, Director
Alaska Public Offices Commission (APOC)
Department of Administration (DOA)
Anchorage, Alaska
POSITION STATEMENT: Provided comments and responded to
questions during discussion of HB 281.
JOYCE ANDERSON, Ethics Committee Administrator
Select Committee on Legislative Ethics
Alaska State Legislature
Anchorage, Alaska
POSITION STATEMENT: Provided comments and responded to
questions during discussion of HB 281.
REPRESENTATIVE CRAIG JOHNSON
Alaska State Legislature
Juneau, Alaska
POSITION STATEMENT: Offered a comment during discussion of
HB 281.
ACTION NARRATIVE
CHAIR JAY RAMRAS called the House Judiciary Standing Committee
meeting to order at 1:09:53 PM. Representatives Holmes,
Dahlstrom, Coghill, Samuels, and Ramras were present at the call
to order. Representatives Gruenberg and Lynn were excused.
HB 286 - IMPERSONATING A PUBLIC SERVANT
1:10:10 PM
CHAIR RAMRAS announced that the first order of business would be
HOUSE BILL NO. 286, "An Act relating to impersonating a public
servant."
REPRESENTATIVE DAHLSTROM, speaking as the sponsor of HB 286,
explained that the bill will increase the penalty for unlawfully
impersonating a peace officer to a class C felony; currently,
impersonating a public servant, including a peace officer, is a
[class B] misdemeanor. In today's society, she observed, there
are those who use such deception as part of a criminal act,
luring unsuspecting victims into a false sense of security.
Intentionally misleading people in this way should have a more
severe penalty than is currently provided, she opined, and the
bill adds teeth to existing law. She also indicated that her
hope is that this increased penalty will also serve as a
deterrent to those who would put the lives and safety of people
in jeopardy by pretending to be a peace officer.
1:12:18 PM
JENNIFER BAXTER, Staff to Representative Nancy Dahlstrom, Alaska
State Legislature, relayed on behalf of Representative
Dahlstrom, sponsor, that HB 286 adds to existing law another
crime, specifically that of impersonating a public servant in
the first degree - pretending to be a peace officer. In
response to questions, she said that the current penalty [for
impersonating a public servant] is a class B misdemeanor; that
misdemeanor crimes don't generally subject the perpetrator to
[much if any] jail time unless he/she has a significant a
criminal history; and that the reason for providing a penalty of
a class C felony is that Legislative Legal and Research Services
indicated that that would be the appropriate next level of
penalty.
REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL, acknowledging that someone could falsely
use a peace officer's position of authority to gain access to
potential victims, noted that under the bill, impersonating a
peace officer would be a felony even if nothing bad resulted
from that behavior.
REPRESENTATIVE DAHLSTROM offered her belief that passage of the
bill will allow law enforcement officials to immediately
incarcerate a person who is impersonating a peace officer and
seize the vehicle and/or other equipment he/she is using to
further that impersonation.
REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL said he is questioning why they should
make certain behavior a felony if that behavior doesn't result
in something bad occurring.
REPRESENTATIVE HOLMES, noting that AS 11.56.830(a) says in part,
"the person pretends to be a public servant and does any act in
that capacity", questioned what "any act in that capacity" would
entail. She surmised that the bill is not intended to apply to
someone who dresses up as a police officer on Halloween.
1:17:16 PM
CHAIR RAMRAS posited that the existing statute could apply to
someone who [falsely] claims to be working for the State of
Alaska.
MS. BAXTER, with regard to the issue of people dressing up as
police officers on Halloween, confirmed that the bill would not
apply in those situations because those people are not acting in
the capacity of peace officers. With regard to the issue of
making it a class C felony to impersonate a peace officer, she
said that the goal is to target those who intend to cause harm
by impersonating law enforcement personnel specifically, and
mentioned that "peace officer" is defined [in AS 11.81.900] as:
(44) "peace officer" means a public servant vested by
law with a duty to maintain public order or to make
arrests, whether the duty extends to all offenses or
is limited to a specific class of offenses or
offenders;
MS. BAXTER offered her understanding that some specific examples
of persons impersonating peace officers will be provided,
including examples in which no harm had yet been caused. She
too offered her hope that passage of HB 286 will act as a
deterrent to those considering impersonating a peace officer.
1:20:24 PM
GARY "ROB" COX, President, Public Safety Employees Association,
Inc. (PSEA); State Trooper, B Detachment, Division of Alaska
State Troopers, Department of Public Safety (DPS), indicated
that the PSEA appreciates the introduction of HB 286. He
surmised that most people have heard of incidents wherein
someone has impersonated a peace officer, and that those people
have felt some form of shock and anguish upon hearing of those
incidents regardless of their outcome. He said he knows of two
such impersonators in the Matanuska-Susitna (MAT-SU) valley
alone, and of others elsewhere. Currently, the crime of
impersonating a peace officer is merely a class B misdemeanor,
which, he remarked, is slightly more serious than a traffic
violation and is seldom prosecuted. He noted that although none
of the Alaska cases that he is aware of have yet resulted in the
injury, death, or sexual assault of the impersonator's victims,
those victims with whom he has spoken all relayed that they
experienced extreme fear.
MR. COX offered his belief that the Alaska cases seem to have
been motivated by "ego, experimentation, or some twisted sense
of 'fun.'" Because real law enforcement officers have been
swift to apprehend the impersonators in the Alaska cases, none
of those cases had ugly outcomes. However, other states have
not been so fortunate; the impersonation of a peace officer in
those states has resulted in real law enforcement officers
having to investigate the ensuing murder, assault, and rape
crimes that those impersonators have perpetrated. The most
recent perpetrator in the Mat-Su valley was apprehended a few
weeks ago. Both state and local police had been searching for
this individual for some time, and he had once previously been
charged with impersonating a public servant but had never been
prosecuted for or convicted of that crime.
MR. COX said that even though that individual had flashed his
vehicle's red and blue lights at citizens, the trooper didn't
arrest the individual for the crime of impersonating a public
servant because he believed that it was not an arrestable
offense. Fortunately, the individual had also been drinking,
and so he was arrested for driving under the influence (DUI) and
his vehicle and "peace officer equipment" was impounded "before
he could do anything really ugly." Mr. Cox characterized HB 286
as being good for both Alaska and law enforcement agencies
because it increases the penalty for impersonating a peace
officer to a felony; the bill will enable law enforcement
officers to, with probable cause, stop and arrest such
impersonators, and will strongly discourage such impersonations
"by would-be pranksters or egomaniacs."
MR. COX, in conclusion, opined that HB 286 enhances mutual trust
and demonstrates real commitment to the safety of Alaskans and
the state's law enforcement officers. The PSEA and law
enforcement officers, he relayed, strongly encourage passage of
the bill.
1:25:13 PM
MR. COX, in response to questions, said that although an exact
police/trooper uniform is difficult to come by, perpetrators of
this crime don't find it necessary to dress up in such a uniform
because everyone is familiar with the fact that both off-duty
and plain-cloths officers make traffic stops and otherwise
contact the public. The aforementioned individual, in fact,
actually told a real police officer that he was merely an off-
duty state trooper, and his car looked like an unmarked police
car. Furthermore, anybody can purchase the emergency lights and
radio equipment used by real law enforcement, and the
aforementioned individual had done so, though he later put that
equipment up for sale on "E-Bay." Mr. Cox surmised that with
the car and the equipment, it would have been very difficult, if
not impossible, for someone to differentiate the impersonator
from an authentic peace officer.
REPRESENTATIVE SAMUELS asked whether the bill would also make
impersonating a peace officer over the telephone a class C
felony.
MR. COX said that even over the phone, when he tells someone he
is a trooper, that person automatically trusts him and is much
more open to providing personal information such as date of
birth and social security number.
CHAIR RAMRAS surmised that under the bill, impersonating a
public servant other than a peace officer would remain a class B
misdemeanor, and impersonating a peace officer would become a
class C felony.
MS. BAXTER concurred; specifically, impersonating a peace
officer would be impersonating a public servant in the first
degree, [and impersonating any other type of public servant
would be impersonating a public servant in the second degree].
CHAIR RAMRAS opined that impersonating a peace officer over the
phone doesn't pose the same danger or instill the same sense of
fear as doing so in person.
REPRESENTATIVE DAHLSTROM disagreed, and pointed out that if
either she or her children were at home by themselves and they
received a call from someone claiming to be a peace officer [but
suspected that to be a false claim], that would be very
disturbing, especially if that person then started threatening
them.
MR. COX pointed out that with the proliferation of cellular
telephones, the impersonator could actually be calling the
victim right from his/her own driveway; just because the
impersonator is on the phone doesn't diminish the danger or the
threat that he/she poses.
CHAIR RAMRAS noted that a person could impersonate a peace
officer over the Internet as well.
REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL asked whether the DOL would treat the
crime of impersonating a public servant in the first degree the
same way it treats other class C felonies. He noted that the
term "public servant" refers to many people other than peace
officers.
1:35:08 PM
RICK SVOBODNY, Deputy Attorney General, Central Office, Criminal
Division, Department of Law (DOL), offered that although in
general there are not provisions of law wherein a particular
conduct jumps from a class B misdemeanor to a class C felony,
that's not to say that making a crime a class C felony is
inappropriate, because that's simply a public policy question
regarding how serious the offense is. Mr. Svobodny said he
takes some exception to the statement by Mr. Cox that class B
misdemeanors don't get prosecuted; rather, perhaps it's simply
that class B misdemeanors aren't being submitted for prosecution
by law enforcement officers because those offenses aren't
perceived as being serious. Furthermore, he relayed, he would
like to hear about district attorney offices that aren't
prosecuting cases simply based of the classification the
legislature chose for a particular offense.
MR. SVOBODNY explained that the difference between a class C
felony and a class B misdemeanor is that the maximum penalty for
the latter is 90 days in jail, whereas the maximum penalty for
the former is five years in jail. However, that's not to say
that those are the sentences a person will receive. In response
to a question, he explained that a person convicted of a felony
loses the right to carry a concealable firearm for a period of
time, and has some other restrictions placed on him/her with
regard to voting rights and jury duty. Furthermore, outside of
any legal impediments, society imposes other impediments to
convicted felons such as difficulty in obtaining bonding or
employment.
REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL observed that some felons can also be
precluded from working with vulnerable people. He said he wants
to ensure that the proposed increase in penalty is truly
warranted and will only be applied to those who actually do pose
a danger to society.
1:39:54 PM
MR. SVOBODNY, in response to a question, explained that current
law makes no distinction between impersonating [a public
servant] remotely - via any type of device - and doing it in
person; impersonating a police officer, again, whether in person
or over the telephone [or Internet], is currently only a class B
misdemeanor. Furthermore, people's imaginations are fertile and
there could be circumstances, he surmised, wherein a victim
could be substantially more afraid if the impersonation is done
over the phone as opposed to in person.
CHAIR RAMRAS questioned whether the bill would make a felon out
of someone who calls up his/her friend and pretends to be a
trooper or police officer simply as a joke.
MR. SVOBODNY explained that the culpable mental state which
applies under the bill is that one must knowingly impersonate a
peace officer and must knowingly engage in an act - in the
aforementioned hypothetical example, the act is the verbal
communication - so although the person has technically violated
the law, under the American system of justice, prosecutors have
the discretion to determine that a crime wasn't really committed
in such a case since there was no intent to cause harm.
However, because current statute doesn't specify that there be
an intent to harm, the actions in the aforementioned example do
constitute a crime. He remarked that in 1978, when the
legislature passed the current statute, there was a very good
reason, particularly for a class B misdemeanor, for not
requiring intent: the behavior of impersonating a public
servant scares people. For example, he added, if his wife
received a phone call from somebody who said he/she works for
City & Borough of Juneau (CBJ) and needs to know whether the
electrical meter was located inside the house - whether the
person was playing around or not - that would scare her if she
ultimately found out that that person was not who he/she was
pretending to be.
CHAIR RAMRAS said he is simply questioning whether such behavior
rises to the level of a class C felony.
REPRESENTATIVE DAHLSTROM, referring to Chair Ramras's
hypothetical example, pointed out that such a person would never
even come to the attention of police and prosecutors unless
his/her friend filed a complaint about the behavior, whereas if
she were to receive a call from someone claiming to be a peace
officer and she [suspected that that claim wasn't true], she
would call the police because she would assume that if the
person has her phone number, he/she probably also knows her
address, what she looks like, and perhaps even what her schedule
is.
MR. SVOBODNY concurred, adding that even though it is a crime to
punch another person, for example, no one reports that his/her
four-year-old child hit an older sibling. Similarly, people who
are simply joking around with each other over the phone are not
going to be dealt with via criminal law.
CHAIR RAMRAS again questioned whether impersonating a peace
officer over the phone rises to the level of a class C felony,
or whether such behavior should remain a class B misdemeanor.
MR. SVOBODNY again said he could conceive of a situation where
impersonating a peace officer over the phone could be more
frightening for the victim than if it were done in person.
Though, as a general rule, he acknowledged, distance between
parties lessens the fear. With regard to Representative
Dahlstrom's comment, he added, if the person calling her doesn't
yet have her address, he/she can easily obtain it over the
Internet - that's a very frightening thing to a lot of people in
this country.
1:50:35 PM
REPRESENTATIVE HOLMES suggested that given that there is no
mental state required for the class B misdemeanor provided for
under current law, perhaps there needs to be a higher barrier
when raising the behavior to class C felony.
MR. SVOBODNY suggested that there should be three levels of this
offense: a class B misdemeanor for impersonating a public
servant; a class A misdemeanor for impersonating a public
servant with the intent to do harm; and a class C felony when
impersonating a peace officer with the intent to do harm. He
added:
I think it's got to be a very scary thing if somebody
comes to your door, knocks on the door, and wants to
get access to your house under the ruse of being a
building inspector. And that may well be more
frightening than somebody calling on the phone and
saying they're from the Benevolent Order of Police and
please contribute $100. ... They're both really
intending to do harm ... but it seems to me there
ought to be maybe a gradation of what happens here.
REPRESENTATIVE HOLMES again asked what the phrase, "and does any
act in that capacity" would entail.
MR. SVOBODNY said that since the word, "act" is not yet defined
in statute, one would have to use the dictionary definition of
what an "act" entails. So for the crime of terroristic
threatening, for example, repeated acts are required, and the
appellate courts have indicated that a communication is an act.
Therefore, he surmised, to communicate a certain piece of
information would constitute an act - a verbal act. With regard
to a person dressing up as a police officer on Halloween, he
posited that in order for the bill to apply to such a person,
he/she would have to commit an act in the capacity of a peace
officer, such as attempting to restrain or arrest someone.
1:54:53 PM
REPRESENTATIVE DAHLSTROM observed that sometimes an act doesn't
have to be an overt act; someone dressed up as a peace officer,
or driving a vehicle that looks like a peace officer's vehicle
can elicit certain reactions from people even if no verbal
exchange takes place.
REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL said he tends to agree with Mr.
Svobodny's suggestion regarding having three levels of crime.
Many public servants have certain authority over others, such as
employees of the Office of Children's Services (OCS) and
building inspectors, and sometimes individuals have posed as
such employees in order to obtain information. Furthermore,
when being directed to pull over by a vehicle that has flashing
lights, a person may not be aware that he/she is about to find
himself/herself in a dangerous situation. With regard to
playing pranks by impersonating someone, he acknowledged that as
a teenager, he and his friends perhaps did some things they
shouldn't have because they didn't realize the gravity of their
actions, and so he would not want to saddle such a person with a
class C felony. However, some people really are bad actors and
they intend to do bad things to others by using the position of
trust that society has generally [granted], and so he doesn't
mind, he relayed, making those bad actors felons, because, for
him, such behavior rises to that level.
REPRESENTATIVE DAHLSTROM, in response to a comment that the term
"public servant" is broad, pointed out that the crime of
impersonating a public servant is already addressed via existing
statute and won't be changed by the bill.
REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL indicated that his concern is that the
proposed increase in penalty could be applied inappropriately,
though he acknowledged that there is a safeguard in that one
must first be convicted. He said he is questioning whether
impersonating some other public servants should also rise to the
level of a felony, particularly given that in the past, for
example, the legislature has discussed the issue of whether to
let employees of the then-Child Support Enforcement Division
(CSED) carry handguns while performing their duties.
2:03:01 PM
CHAIR RAMRAS expressed interest in Mr. Svobodny's suggestion.
MR. SVOBODNY reiterated his suggestion, and noted that in a
recent movie, someone with bad intentions impersonated a peace
officer in order to kill another person. Although such behavior
is not common, it is not unheard of for people to impersonate a
peace officer in order to gain some type of advantage.
REPRESENTATIVE HOLMES indicated that she would be more
comfortable if the bill included some sort of intent-to-do-harm
language, because she wants to ensure that the bill only applies
to actual bad actors.
REPRESENTATIVE SAMUELS pointed out, however, that if such
language is included for the crime of impersonating a peace
officer, then in situations like the one described by Mr. Cox -
where the person acquired a vehicle [resembling an unmarked
police car] and lights and a siren - the prosecution would then
also have to prove that the person had the intent to do harm.
Representative Samuels said that for such people, he is
satisfied with the bill as it is currently written, because why
else would one go through the trouble of obtaining such
equipment and then attempting to pull people over if not to
perpetrate a crime. He indicated, though, that he would be
amenable to the change suggested by Mr. Svobodny regarding
impersonating other types of public servants. Representative
Samuels offered his belief that the bill would never be applied
in situations where friends are playing jokes on each other.
MR. SVOBODNY, in response to a question, offered his belief that
the definition of "public servant" is sufficiently broad, and
would apply to those impersonating the types of public servants
Representative Coghill mentioned, adding that it would not be a
defense for someone to claim that the position he/she was
impersonating doesn't exist.
REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL, in response to a question, reiterated
his concern that perhaps impersonating a public servant other
than a peace officer also ought to rise to the level of a
felony.
2:09:27 PM
REPRESENTATIVE DAHLSTROM said she is not intending for the bill
to address the impersonation of public servants other than peace
officers.
MR. COX also concurred that the bill would not apply in
situations where friends are playing pranks on each other since
one of the parties would first have to file a complaint and the
responding law enforcement officer would still have the
discretion of whether to pursue the issue. With regard to
adding language requiring that the impersonator have the
intention of doing harm, he opined that that would take the
threshold too high - a police officer would be unable to stop an
impersonator before he/she actually injures or kills someone.
He suggested that perhaps the bill could be changed to say
something along the lines of, "exercises or attempts to exercise
official authority"; with such a change, the impersonator's
actions would demonstrate intent. He characterized an
impersonator's attempts to pull someone over as a serious
violation of a person's rights.
MR. COX, with regard to impersonating a peace officer over the
phone, offered his believe that such behavior does rise to the
level of a felony, particularly given that the crime of assault
in the third degree, which in part addresses the behavior of
making repeated threats to cause death or injury, is a class C
felony offense as long as it causes the fear in the victim that
that really will happen. With regard to juvenile pranks, he
opined that it would be pretty easy for a citizen to determine
that a youth isn't really a peace officer.
2:14:14 PM
JEFFREY LANDVATTER, Public Safety Employees Association, Inc.
(PSEA); State Trooper, A Detachment, Division of Alaska State
Troopers, Department of Public Safety (DPS), opined that HB 286
is fundamental to the foundation of good policing. Police are
given a high level of trust and training, and someone falsely
presenting himself/herself as a peace officer breaks down the
public trust, and makes it very difficult for law enforcement
officers to do their job.
MR. SVOBODNY, in response to a question, opined that Mr. Cox's
suggestion would have the same problem with proving intent.
Currently one must commit an act, which includes a pretty broad
range of conduct; he then acknowledged that including intent-to-
do-harm language, as he'd suggested earlier, would also present
a proof problem. He said he agrees with the officers: the oath
that they are required to take in order to become peace officers
is designed to set them up as examples of people that one can
trust, and one does things for a police officer, because he/she
appears to be a police officer, that one wouldn't do for someone
else. This does create more dangerous situations, both for
police officers in the normal course of their duty and for the
public when responding to someone they think is a police officer
but isn't.
MR. SVOBODNY suggested instead: keep the current crime of
impersonating a public servant a class B misdemeanor; make the
crime of impersonating a public servant with the intent to gain
access to a dwelling or the intent to do harm a class A
misdemeanor; and make impersonating a peace officer a class C
felony as the bill currently proposes.
REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL said he likes that suggestion, but is not
sure of the practical implications.
REPRESENTATIVE SAMUELS noted that Anchorage Municipal Code says:
8.30.070 Impersonation of public officer.
A. A person commits the crime of impersonation of a
public officer if the person knowingly and falsely
represents himself to be a public officer and in such
assumed character:
1. Obtains money, property, or other thing of
value, or
2. Arrests or detains, threatens to arrest or
detain, or otherwise threatens any person; or
3. Searches a person or property; or
4. Obtain or requires the assistance of another
in any matter pertaining to the duties of a public
officer.
B. As used in this section, a public officer includes
peace officers, firemen, paramedics, magistrates,
judges, municipal attorneys and prosecutors, municipal
inspectors, officials, or clerks, but is not limited
to them.
C. Violation of this section shall, upon conviction,
be punished by a fine of not more than $2,000.00 or
imprisonment for not more than six months, or both
such fine and imprisonment.
REPRESENTATIVE SAMUELS acknowledged, though, that the problem
with "spelling it out" is that then the language might not apply
in every case that it should.
MR. SVOBODNY concurred.
REPRESENTATIVE SAMUELS indicated that he would be in favor of
Mr. Svobodny's suggestion regarding making public-servant
impersonators seeking access into someone's dwelling a class A
misdemeanor.
REPRESENTATIVE HOLMES surmised that all members are in support
of the intent of HB 286, and acknowledged that it addresses a
serious problem. Referring to the issue of a perpetrator's
mental state, she asked what other felonies might compare.
MR. SVOBODNY offered that the crimes of theft of $500 or more;
shoplifting of $500 or more; DUI; bootlegging; causing somebody
to fear serious physical injury by means of a dangerous
instrument - for example, pounding a bat against a wall right
next to somebody; and check forgery are all class C felonies.
REPRESENTATIVE DAHLSTROM said her preference is to move forward
with the bill as it is currently written, rather than altering
it to address some of the other issues that have been raised.
CHAIR RAMRAS closed public testimony on HB 286.
REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL opined that anytime the legislature makes
a particular crime a felony, the justification for doing so
needs to be vetted. He indicated that he is satisfied that the
crime of impersonating a peace officer does rise to the level of
a felony.
2:25:51 PM
REPRESENTATIVE DAHLSTROM moved to report HB 286 out of committee
with individual recommendations [and the accompanying fiscal
notes]. There being no objection, HB 286 was reported from the
House Judiciary Standing Committee.
HB 281 - CAMPAIGN FINANCE COMPLAINTS
2:26:40 PM
CHAIR RAMRAS announced that the final order of business would be
HOUSE BILL NO. 281, "An Act extending the statute of limitations
for the filing of complaints with the Alaska Public Offices
Commission involving state election campaigns." [Before the
committee was CSHB 281(STA).]
2:27:48 PM
MIKE SICA, Staff to Representative Bob Lynn, Alaska State
Legislature, said on behalf of Representative Lynn, one of the
bill's joint prime sponsors, that HB 281 basically does two
things. It increases the statute of limitations, from one and
two years to five years, for filing a complaint with the Alaska
Public Offices Commission (APOC) and the Select Committee on
Legislative Ethics, and establishes a period of six years for
the retention of records related to such complaints. The bill
also contains several conforming changes. The goal is to create
a uniform standard for time limits and the retention of records
under four of the provisions of statute that are overseen by the
APOC and the Select Committee on Legislative Ethics: AS 15.13
pertaining to state election campaigns; AS 24.45 pertaining to
regulation of lobbying; AS 24.60 pertaining to standards of
conduct for the legislative branch; and AS 39.50 pertaining to
public official financial disclosure.
MR. SICA said that in 2003, the aforementioned statute of
limitations [for filing a complaint with the APOC] was changed
from four years to one year, but problems have since arisen
because of that shorter statute of limitations in that certain
alleged violations cannot now be investigated; the Select
Committee on Legislative Ethics currently has a two-year statute
of limitations but no statute of limitations in instances of
intentional prevention of discovery. Again, the bill would
increase the statute of limitations for filing a complaint, with
either the APOC or the Select Committee on Legislative Ethics,
to five years. Referring to the change requiring that records
be retained for six years, he observed that this proposed change
makes sense if the statute of limitations is changed to five
years because then the records associated with any complaint
filed within that timeframe will still be available to the
investigating authority.
MR. SICA offered assurance that both agencies will still have
the same speedy adjudication process in place; for example, once
the APOC begins investigating a complaint, statute requires that
that investigation be concluded in 60 days. The statute of
limitations in some other states ranges from one year to five
years, Georgia has a three-year statute of limitations for two-
year terms and a five-year statute of limitations for four-year
terms, some states have no statute of limitations, some states
have an "intentional prevention of discovery" clause, and some
states have a combination of the aforementioned.
MR. SICA noted that in the House State Affairs Standing
Committee, an amendment was adopted that would change current
law with regard to who can file a complaint. Currently, under
almost all the aforementioned provisions, any person can file a
complaint, and the term "person", as statutorily defined, covers
everyone from a natural person to an organization or a political
party. He relayed that Brooke Miles from the APOC has told him
that in fact most of the complaints filed with the APOC come
from political parties during election time; "they do a
wonderful job of keeping each other in line," he added. Mr.
Sica relayed that Representative Lynn feels that allowing
political parties, rather than just individual candidates, to
file complaints depersonalizes and depoliticizes the complaint
process, thus alleviating what could otherwise turn out to be a
nasty feud between candidates.
MR. SICA added that that's how the process has worked in the
past, and that [Representative Lynn] would like this committee
to revisit that issue because he feels that the process should
be based on the merits of the complaint rather than on the
qualifications of the person filing the complaint. House Bill
281 addresses a [potential] loophole, and increasing the statute
of limitations will be a step forward, particularly if it
doesn't limit legitimate complaints.
2:33:07 PM
REPRESENTATIVE CARL GATTO, Alaska State Legislature, speaking as
a joint prime sponsor of HB 281, relayed that he has had two
complaints filed against him during election seasons, and both
were dismissed after the elections were over. It's fairly easy
to file a complaint on a person, he noted, adding that the
newspapers received word of the second complaint before he did;
therefore he takes a strong interest in who can file a
complaint, how a complaint is heard, and how one recovers from a
complaint being filed.
REPRESENTATIVE SAMUELS noted that Section 1 would change AS
15.13.040(f) to read:
All businesses, persons, or groups that furnish any of
the following services, facilities, or supplies to a
candidate or group shall maintain a record of each
transaction for a period of six years from the date of
the election: newspapers, radio, television,
advertising, advertising agency services, accounting,
billboards, printing, secretarial, public opinion
polls, or research and professional campaign
consultation or management, media production or
preparation, or computer services. Records of
provision of services, facilities, or supplies shall
be available for inspection by the commission.
REPRESENTATIVE SAMUELS opined that any company he hires to do a
print job for him, for example, isn't going to know that it will
be required to keep records of that transaction for six years.
Referring to Section 2, he indicated that once he leaves the
state legislature, he won't be inclined to keep for six years
any records related to his term of office, though he
acknowledged that he could probably just put all his records in
a box and hope he doesn't lose it during any subsequent moves.
He asked whether other states require that records be kept for
six years.
MR. SICA mentioned that that provision falls under the purview
of the APOC, and offered his understanding that current law is
silent on the issue of how long records must be retained.
2:37:57 PM
BROOKE MILES, Director, Alaska Public Offices Commission (APOC),
Department of Administration (DOA), said that although a
provider of services may include a small print shop, the
provision is meant to apply to "the bigger people" such as
campaign managers, media providers and producers, and poll
providers and producers. She clarified that currently such
entities are required to keep such records for a year, and noted
that the APOC has heard a lot of comments from the public
regarding the APOC's current one-year statute of limitations.
REPRESENTATIVE HOLMES, referring to Section 1, relayed that
she'd hired a campaign manager who worked for her for only eight
weeks, and asked whether under the bill that individual would
have to keep all records related to that work for six years.
MS. MILES said that in that type of situation, the APOC would
expect the candidate to keep such records, since the employee
would have merely had a contractual agreement to work for the
candidate.
REPRESENTATIVE SAMUELS said he agrees with that intent, but
pointed out that that's not what the bill says.
MS. MILES noted that the language regarding who is required to
keep such records is already part of existing statute, and all
that's being changed via Section 1 is the length of time records
must be kept. She acknowledged that Section 1 could be crafted
more carefully, and pointed out that she is only relaying how
the APOC staff has used this provision as an enforcement tool.
REPRESENTATIVE GATTO referred to Section 2, and offered his
understanding that unless an entity is required to report to the
APOC, that entity won't be required to preserve records.
Concurring with Ms. Miles's statement that it would be the
[candidate] who is required to maintain the records, since it is
the candidate who is required to report to the APOC, he asked
whether the language of Section 2 would alleviate members'
concerns regarding Section 1.
MS. MILES said that Section 2 - which is proposing to insert a
new section of statute - addresses "the filer's" retention of
records, and pertains to candidates, political parties,
political action committees (PACs), and groups supporting or
opposing ballot measures including individuals who must file
reports as a result of having participated in independent
expenditures. Section 1, in comparison, requires providers of
services to retain records.
2:43:12 PM
JOYCE ANDERSON, Ethics Committee Administrator, Select Committee
on Legislative Ethics, Alaska State Legislature, relayed that
Section 8 deals with the Legislative Ethics Act, and proposes to
change the statute of limitations regarding when a complaint
must be filed from two years to five years, and therefore also
removes language specific to complaints against former
legislators. With regard to the provision in CSHB 281(STA)
requiring that complaints be filed only by registered voters as
opposed to any person, she noted that the Legislative Ethics Act
has always said that complaints may be initiated by "any
person", and that the Select Committee on Legislative Ethics has
not had any issues arise regarding that language. To her
knowledge, she relayed, only individuals, rather than groups,
have filed complaints with the Select Committee on Legislative
Ethics; furthermore, no one from out of state has filed any
complaints.
MS. ANDERSON noted that under the Legislative Ethics Act, the
Select Committee on Legislative Ethics reviews a complaint and
determines whether [the alleged behavior] falls under its
jurisdiction and whether the allegation if proven true would be
a violation; if the complaint does meet those criteria, then the
Select Committee on Legislative Ethics moves forward with it.
If a complaint doesn't meet those criteria, though, it is
dismissed and nothing is made public. Complaints filed with the
APOC, on the other hand, are all made public regardless of
whether any investigations ensue. She indicated that for the
sake of consistency, [the Select Committee on Legislative
Ethics] recommended that the statutes pertaining to complaints
filed with the APOC be changed such that there would be no
statute of limitations in instances of intentional prevention of
discovery.
REPRESENTATIVE SAMUELS surmised that replacing the word "person"
with the term "registered voter" would preclude a political
party from filing a complaint, and offered his understanding
that Mr. Sica had said that allowing political parties to file
complaints would makes the complaints less personal.
MR. SICA concurred, noted that both current law and the bill as
originally drafted allowed political parties to file complaints,
and reiterated that the change from "person" to "registered
voter" occurred in the House State Affairs Standing Committee.
REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL offered his recollection that part of the
discussion that occurred in the House State Affairs Standing
Committee pertained to limiting who could file complaints, and
some members in that committee felt complaints should only be
filed by voters.
REPRESENTATIVE GATTO noted that the language currently in HB 281
doesn't specify which state the voter must be registered in.
MR. SICA relayed that members' packets include a proposed
amendment defining the term, "registered voter" as meaning a
person who is registered to vote under AS 15.07.
REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL acknowledged that that point should be
clarified if the bill retains the term "registered voter".
Although political groups can currently hold each other
accountable, he added, the complaint process can also be used by
them as a delaying tactic.
2:50:36 PM
MS. ANDERSON said she agrees with Mr. Sica's comments. A
compliant filed by the Alaska Public Interest Research Group
(AkPIRG) or the League of Women Voters of Alaska, for example,
is different than a complaint filed by an individual, because
clearly it is a group and not just one person that feels there
is an issue. She opined that they should leave open the option
for organizations to file complaints, as opposed to just
allowing registered voters to file complaints.
REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL also noted that complaints filed with the
APOC become public, and indicated that an issue to consider is
whether complaints filed by groups are legitimate.
CHAIR RAMRAS asked what HB 281 will achieve for the public good.
MS. ANDERSON said that the main intent is to increase the
statute of limitations regarding when a complaint can be filed.
The question is whether the current statute of limitations is
long enough, particularly given that sometimes the facts of a
situation don't become evident until after the current statute
of limitations has run out. Increasing the statute of
limitations to five years will allow the public, if they obtain
knowledge within five years that a possible wrongdoing has
occurred, to still be able to file a complaint; for example, if
the subject of a complaint had been trying to influence others
in order to get legislation passed. She mentioned that some
such incidents came to light during the recent indictments of
certain legislators.
CHAIR RAMRAS offered his understanding that the bill focuses on
the conduct of elected officials while in office and increases
the statute of limitations regarding when a complaint can be
filed, and that these proposed changes were engendered by recent
events.
MS. ANDERSON concurred with that summation.
2:57:01 PM
MS. MILES explained that it was the APOC which requested that
the statute of limitations be increased. The current one-year
statute of limitations has proven to be far too short, and, as a
result, the APOC has been raked over the coals and blamed for
that; furthermore, she relayed, she, personally, has been
attacked for complying with the existing statute of limitations.
Therefore, the APOC went on record as saying that the statute of
limitations needed to be expanded, and the APOC strongly
supports that expansion. In working through the statutes that
the APOC administers, it was determined that there is a mishmash
of statute of limitations and sometimes none at all is
specified. With regard to possible violations that the APOC
could not pursue because of the current one-year statute of
limitations, one issue pertained to major corporations having
all their executives make campaign contributions that were
actually paid for directly by the corporations; this is a clear
violation of the law, but the APOC was unable to do anything
about it. With regard to records retention, it only makes sense
for the period of time in which records must be kept to at least
match - or supersede by one year - the statute of limitations so
that the investigating authority can access substantiating
documents, because, without those documents, it will be more
difficult to investigate complaints of wrongdoing.
MS. MILES indicated that the APOC is in favor of removing from
the bill the proposed term of "registered voter." Under the
laws administered by the APOC, one provision pertaining to
lobbying requires that the person filing the complaint be a
qualified voter; without this requirement, a complaint could be
filed by anyone, including APOC staff. The argument raised in
the House State Affairs Standing Committee was that if
complaints weren't limited to a qualified voter, then even a
foreign national could file a complaint against a candidate.
That has never happened, she pointed out, though complaints have
been brought forth by groups and political parties, none of
which are a registered voter, and sometimes, in the heat of a
campaign, having the complaint brought forth be a nonperson
helps depoliticize the complaint. It is true, she acknowledged,
that with regard to complaints filed with the APOC, the
complaint [form] itself becomes a public document, and staff
makes every effort to get a copy of it to the subject of the
complaint as soon as possible. Unfortunately, sometimes when
someone files a complaint with the APOC, his/her very next stop
is with the press. When a complaint doesn't meet all the
criteria outlined in law, the staff themselves can reject it.
REPRESENTATIVE SAMUELS said that although he can see the
advantages of allowing organizations to file a complaint, the
downside is that individuals get to hide behind the name of an
organization.
REPRESENTATIVE GATTO questioned how one would know that all
members of an organization have agreed to file a complaint. He
also opined that the term "registered voter" should be replaced
with the term "registered Alaska voter".
3:02:47 PM
REPRESENTATIVE CRAIG JOHNSON, Alaska State Legislature, opined
that if candidates are going to be held accountable, then
complaints shouldn't be used as political tools; "if someone has
the fortitude and the knowledge and right on their side to put
their name on it -- but a 'person' by definition under [Alaska]
statute is anything."
CHAIR RAMRAS relayed that HB 281 would be held over.
ADJOURNMENT
There being no further business before the committee, the House
Judiciary Standing Committee meeting was adjourned at 3:03 p.m.
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